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PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
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ACORDOS PREFERENCIAIS DE COMÉRCIO: CRISE OU 
OPORTUNIDADE PARA A OMC?
Julia Marssola12
Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo, com base na análise dos 
principais pontos de confl ito entre APC e a OMC, foi defi nir se 
a proliferação dos APC representava uma crise ou uma opor-
tunidade para a OMC. Para responder a essa pergunta, na pri-
meira seção, este artigo analisou os sintomas que indicam que 
a proliferação dos ACP é uma crise normativa e institucional 
da OMC. Na perspectiva normativa, a regra do consenso, a es-
trutura ultrapassada das disciplinas da OMC e a complexifi -
cação das regras de origem indicam uma crise da OMC. Além 
disso, a supervisão defeituosa do mecanismo de transparência, 
um Secretariado pouco atuante e confl itos de competência são 
questões relevantes na área institucional. Esta pesquisa nos 
permitiu concluir que o crescimento dos ACP é origem e con-
sequência de uma crise na OMC. Na segunda seção, este artigo 
buscou propor alternativas  para aproveitar o novo cenário do 
comércio internacional e aprimorar o sistema multilateral de 
comércio. Como possíveis soluções, identifi camos o fortaleci-
mento da supervisão feita pela OMC dos países com ACP, com 
um Secretariado com mais prerrogativas, e a multilateralização 
dos benefícios percebidos pelas partes a ACP, seja ela de facto 
ou através de uma massa crítica de Membros.
Palavras-chave: Acordos Preferenciais de Comércio; Acordos 
Regionais de Comércio; WTO; Sistema Multilateral de Comércio.
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Abstract:: The aim of this article, based on the analysis of the main 
issues of relationship between the PTA and the WTO, was to define 
whether the proliferation of PTA represented a crisis or an opportunity 
for the WTO. To answer this question, in the first section, this article 
has analyzed the symptoms indicating that the proliferation of the PTA 
is a normative and an institutional crisis of the WTO. In the normative 
perspective, the consensus rule, the outdated framework of WTO disci-
plines and the complexification of rules of origin indicate a crisis for the 
WTO. Moreover, the defective supervision of the transparency mecha-
nism, a weak Secretariat and conflicts of jurisdiction are relevant issues 
on the institutional area.  This research allowed us to conclude that the 
growth of the PTA is both the source and the consequence of a WTO 
crisis. In the second section, this article has tried to think of reasonable 
alternatives to take advantage of the new scenario of international trade 
to improve the multilateral trading system. As possible solutions, we 
identify the strengthening of the supervision made by the WTO of the 
PTA countries, with a more powerful Secretariat, and the multilateral-
ization of the benefits perceived by the PTA parties, whether de facto or 
via a critical mass of Members.
Keywords: Preferential Trade Agreements; Regional Trade Agreements; 
WTO; Multilateral Trading System.
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INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTA)3 and the 
complexification of global value chains (GVC)4 have significantly 
changed the scenario of international trade in recent decades. The cre-
ation of an increasing number of preferential tariffs for goods, as well 
as preferential access to services, combined with dense regulation of in-
struments for bilateral or regional trade, raise concerns about the power 
and stability of the multilateral trading system. 
This deadlock between multilateralism and regionalism of which the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) is particularly a victim (FABRI, 2001, 
p. 943) is an old debate. Back in 1963, Kenneth Dam, in one of the first 
comments on regional agreements ever made, addressed the subject of 
their proliferation (DAM, 1963, p. 615). In 2004, the authors of the WTO 
Sutherland report warned about the risk that these PTA could become a 
justification for non-WTO compliant behavior, in which case preferen-
tial treatment would become a prize for governments whose goals are 
not aligned to those of the WTO (SUTHERLAND, 2004, p. 79).
Nowadays, the WTO is confronted - more than ever, since the PTA 
are responsible for 80% of global trade today - with Members who seek 
preferential treatment when they join the PTA, while those who are not 
3 We adopt in this article the term “Preferential Trade Agreement” because it encompasses 
a larger range than the term “Regional Trade Agreement”. These are agreements concluded 
between two or more parties can, providing that they are appropriately notified to the WTO 
under the Article XXIV of GATT 1994, create more beneficial trade conditions (preferen-
tial), such as the relativization of the most-favored nation principle. Such agreements also 
provide means for Members to achieving consensus in specific agenda they are interested in 
that could not be achieved otherwise (via the regular WTO framework. Cf. MATSUSHITA, 
M. et. al., The World Trade Organization: law, practice and policy, 3rd ed., Oxford University 
Press, 2015, Chapter 17, p. 507 ss.; VAN DEN BOSSCHE, Peter. The law and policy of the 
World Trade Organization: text, cases and materials. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
4 Global value chains (GVCs) refer to international production sharing, a phenomenon 
where production is broken into activities and tasks carried out in different countries. In 
GVCs, the operations are spread across national borders (instead of being confined to the 
same location), with the design originated from one place, components coming from other, 
and assembling realized in a different country with outsourced worked force. They have 
become increasingly complex with globalization and represent an important challenge to 
international trade.  and the products made are much more complex than a pin. Cf. HUM-
PREY, John; Schmitt, Hubert, Governance in Global Value Chains, In: IDS Bulletin, Volume 
32, Issue 3, Wiley Library, July 2001.
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part of these agreements claim that such arrangements have a negative 
impact. Indeed, these agreements are discriminatory by nature, since 
they escape most-favored-nation treatment (TNPF) from Article I of the 
GATT. However, providing that they fulfill certain conditions laid down 
by Article XXIV of the GATT and by Article V of the GATS, they can be 
compatible with WTO law.
This is explained by the logic of trade liberalization within the 
framework of the GATT 1947. This was part of the continuation of a pro-
cess of increasing economic integration between the contracting parties 
who saw in the PTA an opportunity to expand world trade (BOLLYKY, 
MAVROIDIS, 2017). If the PTA are part of the logic of trade opening of 
the GATT 1947 and are, theoretically, in conformity with the rules of 
the WTO through article XXIV of the GATT, how can these agreements 
represent a threat to the WTO? Are they not compatible with the latter?
The difficulty does not arise exactly from plurilateral initiatives to 
achieve objectives that are not sufficiently addressed by the WTO. But 
the PTA are proliferating on such a scale that it has become a systemic 
problem for the WTO (CARREAU, JULLIARD, 2004). The problem arises 
when Members use this option to circumvent the provisions of WTO 
law, thereby creating significant trade distortions. The scale is the ques-
tion, which actually denies the goal of non-discrimination. 
There are several reasons for the growth of regionalism in trade - 
the creation of free trade areas and the emergence of preferential agree-
ments - and the consequent weakening of the WTO. However, these 
reasons can be summed up by two main issues: a generalized crisis of 
the multilateral model, which has occurred in many other institutions 
(DUBIN, RUNAVOT, 2013); and the difficulty of the GATT and of the 
whole WTO system to adapt, in a normative and institutional way, to 
the needs of economic actors and to integrate the new fields which are 
gaining more and more importance in the international trade.
If this regionalist trend has been going on in the recent decades and 
if the current scenario indicates a much broader crisis, with the block 
of the Appellate Body, currently with a single judge, and mega-agree-
ments which bring together major volumes of trade including several 
provisions problematic to the WTO, it is possible to conclude that the 
phenomenon of regionalism will remain. However, if the PTA are an in-
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evitable reality, how to preserve the importance of the role of the WTO 
in times of spaghetti bowl5? Finally, do the PTA represent a crisis or an 
opportunity to the multilateral trading system?
This article will focus on answering this question. At first, we must 
identify and understand the specific issues that arise from the articula-
tion between the PTA and the WTO which result in a crisis for the mul-
tilateral trade system, at the normative and institutional levels. Once the 
elements that characterize this threat have been identified, considering 
the major importance of preserving the WTO as a multilateral institu-
tion, we will discuss possible solutions to make the PTA explosion an 
opportunity to reform and modernize the WTO.
Section 1 studies the PTA-related symptoms that characterize the 
crisis in the multilateral trading system, in the normative (A) and insti-
tutional (B) perspectives.
Regarding the normative crisis experienced by the WTO as a re-
sult – or the cause – of the proliferation of the PTA (A), the principle 
of the single undertaking will be analyzed, which makes negotiations 
within the meaning of the WTO more difficult (A.1); the inadequacy of 
the disciplines covered by the GATT (A.2), which justify the recourse of 
Members to preferential agreements to address the areas not covered by 
WTO; and the difficulty presented by rules of origin as a new challenge 
arising from the complexification of global value chains (A.3).
As for the crisis from the institutional point of view of the WTO 
(B), attention is drawn to the insufficient supervision currently carried 
out by the WTO vis-à-vis the PTA. First, it is important to understand 
the limitations and inconsistencies of GATT Articles XXIV and GATS V 
(B.1), and then discuss the weak operation of the Transparency Mech-
anism (B.2) and, finally, also addressing the subject of the conflict of ju-
risdiction between the dispute settlement mechanisms provided by the 
PTAs and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO (B.3).
Having understood the concerns caused by the PTA countries, the 
symptoms of a crisis in the WTO, section 2 will be dedicated to reflecting 
5 Essentially, these different types of agreements create smaller trade regimes that link 
countries in different ways. Jagdish Bhagwati compares the plethora of trade relations to a 
bowl of spaghetti (BHAGWATI, J.; KRUEGER, A., The Dangerous Drift to Commercial Trade 
Agreements, In: United States trade policy: craze for free trade agreements, Washington, DC: 
AEI Press, 1995.
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on the possible alternatives to transform this systematic crisis into an 
opportunity for reform of the WTO. The possibilities of strengthening 
the Transparency Mechanism (A) and multilateralization (B), de facto 
(B.1) or disbursed (B.2) will be analyzed.
SECTION 1: THE PTA AS A DOUBLE
CRISIS IN THE WTO
In this first section, the problematic links between the PTA and the 
WTO will be analyzed, starting from the study of the symptoms which 
configure a crisis from the normative point of view (A) and from the 
institutional point of view (B). 
A) Symptoms of a normative crisis
Symptoms which indicate that the proliferation of the PTA reveals 
a normative crisis in the WTO are (A.1) the difficulty of reaching a deci-
sion; (A.2) the insufficient disciplines covered by the WTO, and (A.3) the 
challenge presented by the definition of rules of origin with the increas-
ing complexity of GVCs.
A.1) The difficulty of making a decision: the principle of the 
single undertaking and decision-making process by consensus
Let us imagine a Parliament which works according to two rules. 
The first requires that everything should be decided unanimously. The 
second requires that each issue should be resolved as a whole, in one 
agreement. This Parliament will never approve anything. According to 
Gary Houfbauer (HOUFBAUER, BHAGWATI, 2007), that’s exactly what 
the WTO is right now. All Members have to agree on almost everything.
This illustration of the principle of the single undertaking and the 
consensus rule, set forth by Article IX: 1 of the GATT6, helps to under-
stand the difficulty experienced by Members before making a decision. 
These two requirements aim to achieve more legitimate and effective 
6 “The WTO will continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under the 
GATT 1947”.
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decisions, but with diverse and divergent interests among countries, ne-
gotiations are a particularly complex task (CARREAU, JULLIARD, 2004, 
para. 185). Difficulties in achieving universalism or multilateral rela-
tions, such as differences in power, culture and needs, are the sources of 
regionalism (MARCEAU, REIMAN, 2001, p. 299). 
WTO Members use preferential agreements for various economic 
and political reasons. Regionalism therefore allows states sharing the 
same concerns to align. In a smaller regional forum, consensus can be 
more easily reached. In addition, this allows countries that are more mo-
tivated to negotiate to do so faster than through the WTO (HOEKMAN, 
KOSTECKI, 1995, p. 216), where it would be necessary to “convince ev-
eryone else”. Beyond the greater ease of reaching an agreement, the rea-
sons also include research to amplify its markets and increase the level 
of integration, especially between neighbour countries or in the same 
region (COTTIER, FOLTEA, 2006, p. 45).
Recourse to regional or bilateral agreements is not only done to es-
cape the rule of consensus, but also in order to be able to deal with sub-
jects not covered by the WTO.
A.2) The inadequacy of the disciplines covered by the GATT
Material WTO law is based on a legacy of GATT 1947, restricted to 
promoting negative integration and prohibiting tariff barriers, principles 
which today are largely anachronistic in relation to Members’ interests 
and their trade objectives. In the absence of progress from the WTO, coun-
tries are turning to preferential bilateral and regional trade agreements to 
deepen their integration into regulatory matters already covered by the 
WTO, or to go beyond these topics. As argues Ruiz Fabri (2001), it is not 
the PTA that is causing a crisis for the WTO; the real crisis being the fact 
that it is a “young organization with an old-fashioned behavior”7.
When the PTA allow deepening integration in an area covered by 
the WTO, we are in front of a “WTO-plus” agreement. When the goal is 
to extend integration to a new segment, this is an “OMC-extra” agree-
ment. Among the WTO-plus, some examples of subjects concerned 
are services, agriculture, intellectual property, state-owned enterprises, 
7 Original in French : « jeune mais héritière de modes de comportements passés et dépassés ”.
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among others. OMC-extra, on its turn, embeds more specific disciplines, 
such as competition, environment, human rights, energy, labor law, cor-
ruption, etc. A study by Henrik Horn, Petros Mavroidis and André Sapir 
(2010, p. 1565) identified these problems as being the most frequent in 
trade agreements. 
Still in the WTO-extra field, the traditional WTO framework 
does not allow to include consumer preferences and quality require-
ments. Businesses and consumers relied on the standards of private 
or non-profit organizations and third-party certifications to enforce 
their preferences. The resulting cacophony of private rules and stan-
dards has increased compliance costs and poses a challenge to the 
effectiveness of international regulatory oversight (BOLLYKY, MAV-
ROIDIS, 2017, p. 3).
It is a political choice of not including the characteristics and stag-
es of production of a certain product8. The WTO has a very orthodox 
perception of the similarity of the product and its competitive relation-
ship, which is concerned only with similar or directly competitive and 
substitutable finished products. In this case, the WTO refuses to include 
production methods and procedures (PMP) in the definition of similarity 
as a method that allows us to consider that the products are different.
The WTO guarantees non-discriminatory market access, not a right 
of market access. However, as Howse et Regan (2000) stress, in order 
to assess the non-discrimination of Article III of the GATT, the WTO 
impose on Members the obligation of guaranteeing market access for 
foreign products. It is a mistake because what is prohibited is discrimina-
tion: if access becomes compulsory, then the State is no longer sovereign 
in this domain. 
This problem arises when a country approves a law that restricts 
the commercialization of a certain product due to its production 
process (harmful to health or the environment for example) and is 
obliged by the WTO to open access to foreign products which do not 
comply with these rules9. The PTA are very often concerned about 
8 This political choice, although described as negative in this article, was considered, by Bh-
upinder Chimni, as a decision which takes into account the needs of developing countries. S. 
SCHIMNI BS., “Third world approaches to international law: a manifesto”, In: International 
Community Law Review, v. 8, 2006.
9 In the US-Tuna case, the Appellate Body defined that establishing limitations on PMPs falls 
within the definition of discriminatory quantitative restrictions in Article XI.
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these PMPs and thus WTO-extra, in particular on climate and social 
issues. They include chapters of sustainable trade and development, 
in which they aim to express respect for the agreement articulating 
these standards with free trade.
Therefore, as explained by Sorel (2007, p. 59), the origin of the multi-
lateral crisis is not the growing number of PTA countries, “but the struc-
tural weaknesses of the WTO which encourage countries to resort to 
preferential agreements, whether or not they are regional, only to aggra-
vate in return the crisis of multilateralism”10.
To further discuss the difficulty of the WTO to reinvent itself and 
follow the changes that affect trade, the next subsection will analyze 
the consequences of the complexification of the rules of origin resulting 
from GVC.
A.3) The challenge posed by global value chains: the 
complexity of rules of origin 
Alongside the proliferation of the PTA, one of the main innova-
tions in international trade in recent decades is the emergence of glob-
al value chains, which correspond to ⅔ of global trade.
GVC bring us to a very important question: how do we know 
where the product comes from? This is a relevant question because 
production has spread enormously through GVC, with the same prod-
uct being able to bring together suppliers and manufacturers from var-
ious countries. To determine the course of a product, it is necessary to 
determine its rules of origin.
The rules of origin constitute the set of conditions that a prod-
uct must satisfy in order to obtain preferential tariff treatment, as a 
way of avoiding that third-party products can benefit from the same 
treatment. They can be defined by (a) value added requirements (at 
least a certain percentage of the final value must be originated in the 
countries party to the agreement), or through (b) the change in tariff 
classification.
Despite almost 20 years of negotiations in the Doha Round under 
the aegis of the WTO, no multilateral agreement has been concluded 
10 Original in French : “mais les faiblesses structurelles de l’OMC qui encouragent les pays à 
recourir aux accords de préférence, qu’elles soient ou ne soient pas régionales, quittent à aggra-
ver en retour la crise du multilatéralisme”.
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to harmonize non-preferential rules of origin (CONCONI, 2018). The 
WTO rules of origin only establish general rules which must guide the 
rules of origin defined by each country, and some guidelines for the es-
tablishment of preferential rules such as transparency, judicial review 
and rules of non-retroactivity.
Thus, there is a huge variety of rules of origin in PTA, with differ-
ent criteria for determining the origin of each product. This suggests a 
debate about their legality with respect to WTO provisions, that is, if 
they do not cause discrimination. Research shows that rules of origin 
can violate Article XXIV para. 5 (b) to the extent that they significantly 
increase protection for PTA countries (CONCONI, 2018), which leads to 
the construction of real barriers to trade (THORTENSEN et. al., 2014). 
To avoid these consequences, rules of origin must remain “neutral” 
(MATTHIES, 1992), being limited to simply identifying the products 
qualified for the coverage of the tariff preference. If the rules of origin 
become too restrictive, they risk creating real discrimination against 
third countries, therefore being non-compliant with WTO rules. An 
example of an excessively restrictive rule of origin is that of the United 
States-Canada and NAFTA agreements.11.
Despite the Agreement on Rules of Origin, the rules of PTA coun-
tries are more restrictive towards imports from third countries than 
those previously in force. Allowing excessively restrictive rules of ori-
gin to be adopted would amount to authorizing protectionism.
Rivas (2006, p. 152) argues that Article XXIV, in particular para-
graphs 4, 5 (b) can clarify the governance of these rules. Thus, the 
neutrality of rules of origin, and therefore its conformity with Article 
XXIV support the objective of minimizing the adverse effects for third 
countries (BURFISHER, 2004). 
Identified the symptoms for which the PTA represent a normative 
crisis for the WTO, the next subsection will focus on the symptoms of 
an institutional crisis.  
11 When the United States-Canada agreement was still in force, ketchup made in the Unit-
ed States or Canada from tomato sauce imported from third countries, such as Chile, was 
considered to be the origin of the agreement and could therefore benefit from the tariff 
preferences. When the NAFTA rules of origin replaced those of the United States-Canada 
agreement, only ketchup made from tomato sauce of NAFTA origin could receive preferen-
tial treatment. As a result, Chile lost its position as a major exporter of tomato sauce to the 
United States, taken by Mexico. V. NAFTA, Annex 401.
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B) Symptoms of an institutional crisis
One of the functions of the WTO is the management of agree-
ments. If its institutional framework is deficient and, consequently, its 
management is not effective, we face an institutional crisis. To check 
this hypothesis, it is necessary to analyze (B.1) the defective nature of 
the control defined by articles XXIV of GATT and V of GATS (B.2), 
to understand what are the concerns which weaken the supervision 
of the Transparency Mechanism, and (B .3) to study the jurisdictional 
conflict between dispute settlement mechanisms present in the PTA 
and the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.
B.1) The defective control of Articles XXIV of GATT and V 
of GATS
The multilateral trading system exempt, within an exceptional frame-
work and through Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, preferential agree-
ments of most-favored-nation treatment of Article I. To be able to claim 
this exception, these agreements must respect three criteria, laid down by 
article XXIV: (a) cover most trade exchanges between its parties, (b) stab-
lish the absence or the elimination of any discrimination; (c) and prohibit 
new discriminatory measures towards third countries. 
It is problematic to note that the WTO continues to treat regionalism 
or preferentialism according to the logic of GATT 1947, since Article XXIV 
has not changed for GATT 1994. Interestingly, negotiators were aware 
that this Article was insufficient to properly address the issue of PTA, and 
therefore expected that future negotiations of the Doha Round would clar-
ify these disciplines, which was not the case.
With regards to the first requirement, to cover the majority of trade, 
set forth by Article XXIV: 8 (a), in order to comply with WTO law, the 
parties cannot “choose” different products and sectors. This is particular-
ly important because, if the requirement to embark the essential of trade 
in goods and services is properly implemented, the breach of most-fa-
vored-nation treatment is delayed, thereby preserving the multilateral 
trading system (COTTIER, FOLTEA, 2006, p. 48). 
To determine whether most of the trade has been considered, in the 
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area of  services, Article V of the GATS explains the need for a quantitative 
and qualitative approach12. Also, a combined analysis, of quantitative and 
qualitative definition, is indicated by WTO case law for trade in goods13. 
In addition to this non-discrimination obligation and as a way of in-
creasing free trade, GATT Article XXIV recognizes that customs unions 
and free trade areas between WTO members may be desirable (MARCEAU, 
REIMAN, 2001, p. 297). To this end, Article XXIV of GATT and Article V 
of GATS provide for the possibility that Members constituting a PTA may 
derogate from WTO obligations, as recognized by the Appellate Body in 
EC-Bananas III14.
The Appellate Body Report in Turkey-Textiles15 makes it clear that 
the formation of a PTA may justify measures inconsistent with GATT 
rules, but only after having demonstrated (a) the total compatibility of 
the PTA with GATT Article XXIV: 5 and 8 and only (b) if the forma-
tion of the agreement would have been prevented otherwise. The report 
also emphasizes the surveillance responsibility of WTO Members. In 
rendering this decision, the Appellate Body almost introduces a reverse 
consensus rule suggesting that, unless proven otherwise, PTA and their 
preferences are contrary to the multilateral WTO rules (MARCEAU, 
REIMAN, 2001, p. 297). 
Despite this reasoning of the Appellate Body in Turkey-textiles, what 
seems clear is that, even if these articles set conditions for determining the 
compatibility of the PTA with WTO law, these conditions are not really 
subject to a strict control. With the consensus rule, in addition, Members 
are discouraged from helping in the task of oversight for fear of retaliation. 
This is the subject of the next subsection.
B.2) The poor supervision of the Transparency Mechanism
First, it is important to note that WTO Members do not need to 
authorize such agreements. WTO Members do not need to give a 
“green light”; at best, WTO Members can show a “red light” to a PTA 
12 “This condition is understood in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected and 
modes of supply. In order to meet this condition, agreements should not provide for the a 
priori exclusion of any mode of supply”.
13 Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, WT-DS34-AB-R, adopted November 19, 1999, para. 49.
14 Appellate Body Report, EC - Bananas III, WT / DS27 / AB / R, para. 191.
15 Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Textiles, Op. Cit.
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(MARCEAU, REIMAN, 2001, p. 311). However, since WTO members 
make decisions by consensus, only one PTA has been formally recom-
mended to change its elements16. 
In December 2006, the General Council of the WTO established a new 
transparency mechanism for these agreements, which is currently being 
implemented on a provisional basis. This mechanism provides for the rap-
id announcement and notification of any agreement to the WTO, as well 
as the notification of any subsequent change in the implementation or 
operation of an agreement.
This initiative strengthens the power of the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements, responsible for the administration and supervision of 
the PTA that will be notified, and the committee later informs the Secre-
tariat. As for the latter, there is a real desire to contribute more directly 
to the challenge presented by these agreements, which is unlikely to be 
accepted by Members. According to the 2006 decision that created the 
Transparency Mechanism, the Secretariat can make a factual presentation 
of the agreement but cannot challenge them (WTO 2006, para. 10).
In addition to this strictly representative function of the Secretariat in 
the supervision of PTA, another concern is the lack of precision regarding 
the notification period and deadline for Members to notify their agree-
ments. So far, the only guideline is that WTO Members must be taken into 
account in good faith to notify their agreements as soon as possible.
With the weak supervision of the PTA by the WTO, and the purely 
representative role of the Secretariat, even if in several meetings we note 
that these agreements do not comply with Articles XXIV of GATT and V 
of GATS, thus being WTO-less (which covers less trade integration and 
liberalization commitments than those achieved within the WTO), incom-
patible with WTO rules, are being notified without serious consequences.
One could argue that the ineffectiveness of the Transparency Mech-
anism is not a real issue, because there will always be the DSB. However, 
this alternative is not as simple. Most PTA have their own dispute settle-
ment mechanisms, which results in many jurisdictional overlaps, topic of 
the next subsection.
16 Customs union between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, Working Party 
Report, GATT document L-7501, October 4, 1994.
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B.3) The jurisdictional conflict posed by the PTA dispute 
settlement mechanisms
Virtually all WTO Members are parties to free trade agreements. 
Therefore, the assumption that disputes related to these agreements 
are brought before the WTO DSB is not irrelevant. This does not how-
ever happen very often. Yet, these preferential agreements include the 
possibility of countervailing measures for violations, which often con-
sist of a violation of the WTO law. Such measures should therefore be 
analyzed by the DSB. 
However, a theoretical and practical issue arises when we are faced 
with an agreement that includes a provision related to WTO law - for 
example, TNPF. In this situation, there would be double violation: a 
violation of the PTA and a violation of WTO rules. Countries are then 
able to seize the dispute settlement mechanism provided in the agree-
ments and the DSB. That might result in two different (and potentially 
contradictory) awards17 (KWAK, MARCEAU, 2006, p. 467).
In most cases, the PTA let Members decide which mechanism to 
use. In fact, the growth of the PTA has weakened the power of the 
DSB, but also the jurisdictional solutions provided by PTA (CHASE et. 
al, 2016, p.610). Most of the solutions sought by Members therefore go 
rather through the diplomatic channel. Even if this is not a legal solu-
tion, it cannot be said that it does not work. 
One of the problems with these PTA dispute settlement mecha-
nisms is their high confidentiality, which poses a problem with regard 
to the access of less powerful countries to this system (CHASE et. al, 
2016, p. 615). Within the DSB, these benefit considerably from the fig-
ure of the interested third party, which is not possible within the PTA. 
So, if Members want to seek a jurisdictional solution, it will likely be 
the DSB, because small states can use the assistance of the WTO Sec-
retariat (DAVEY, 2006, p. 355). Another concern with the mechanisms 
presents in these agreements is the absence of any element of monitor-
17 This also raise concerns on forum shopping, a practice according to which claimant, in 
this case, WTO Members, will seek jurisdiction at the forum that presents most advantages 
to their case. S. BUSCH, M.L., “Overlapping institutions, forum shopping, and dispute set-
tlement in international trade”; In: International Organization, v. 61, n. 4, p. 735-761, 2007.
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ing the procedures possibly triggered by these mechanisms.
Some free trade agreements contain a conflict clause which gives 
priority, and sometimes exclusivity, to the FTA. The question that aris-
es is whether the waiver or the introduction of an irrevocable choice 
clause can be invoked against WTO jurisdiction, at the risk of falling 
into lis pendens. Kwak and Marceau (2006, p. 481) explain that every-
thing depends on the interpretation that the DSB will give to the con-
cept of lis pendens, if it will consider the cases identical.
If given a choice, Members often prefer to initiate a WTO dis-
pute, faster and more efficient forum. In practice, thanks to its 
speed, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism will be able to pro-
vide decisions - in the form of panel reports, appeal bodies or arbi-
tration - much faster than many other systems and will provide for 
automatic sanctions, while other systems do not have such capabil-
ities (DAVEY, 2006, p. 349).
This means that, in the context of a dispute between two WTO 
Members involving situations governed both by a PTA and by WTO 
agreements, either Member may take the mechanism WTO dispute 
settlement if it considers that one of its benefits under the WTO has 
been violated or compromised. 
The problems highlighted above suggest that the PTA are often 
mobilized for political reasons. If Members pursue the PTA with 
so many non-economic reasons, they do pose many difficulties in 
achieving free trade in the multilateral trading system (DAMRO, 
2006, p. 42). However, it is imperative to understand that the mea-
sures proposed by the DSB and the PTA mechanisms are not at all 
the same, nor have the same objectives (KWAK, MARCEAU, 2006, p. 
468). The aim of a DSB decision is to restore order in the multilateral 
trading system, it is a decision for the whole community and not in 
relation to a specific Member. Decisions of the agreement mecha-
nisms, on the other hand, seek to provide reparation to the party who 
has suffered harm.
Given that this situation is unlikely to constitute lis pendens or 
res judicata, the question of overlapping jurisdictions remains un-
solved (KWAK, MARCEAU, 2006, p. 481-482).
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SECTION 2: THE PTA AS AN
OPPORTUNITY TO REFORM THE WTO
Structured international regulatory cooperation, based on the 
principles of GATT, offers advantages that are difficult to achieve 
unilaterally: predictability, liability, interactive engagement aimed at 
strengthening integration and efficiency gains generated by a larger 
scale. This is the reason for trying to improve, evolve and adapt the 
multilateral trading system to current global trends and needs. The 
challenge is to do so at a time when global economic power is becom-
ing more diffuse.
In order to face the challenge posed by the PTA as an opportunity 
for the renewal of the WTO, this section will discuss (A) the need to 
strengthen the role of the Secretariat and to strengthen supervision 
and transparency; and (B) multilateralization as an alternative, (B.1) de 
facto or (B.2) critical mass.
A) The need to strengthen PTA supervision and the role of 
the Secretariat
As stated earlier in this article, it is generally recognized that the 
GATT revision procedure for PTA is quite insufficient. Efforts are 
therefore necessary to improve this system and minimize the poten-
tial negative effects of the proliferation of the PTA. Cottier and Faltea 
(2006, p. 69-72) indicate four measures to encourage Members’ duty 
of transparency and to strengthen WTO supervision of the compati-
bility of the PTA with its rules.
The first is to simplify the notification procedure and unify the 
system, so that there is only one notification per PTA, regardless of 
its legal basis – Art. XXIV GATT, Art. V GATS or enabling clause18. 
The second is to set up a committee of independent experts to verify 
the compatibility of the agreements, in place of the Transparency 
Mechanism. This would serve to avoid the political conflict of inter-
18 The notification of a PTA is currently done according to its legal basis within the WTO 
framework, whether it is GATT (trade of goods), GATS (trade of services) or the enabling 
clause (developing countries). 
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est which can influence the positioning of Members when analyzing 
a PTA19. The third measure would be to strengthen the role of the 
Secretariat in overseeing its agreements, which, as explained, is cur-
rently quite limited, since the Secretariat cannot effectively oppose to 
an agreement. The fourth and final step is to think about new trade 
remedies. Those existing today are limited “pro futuro” and do not 
encourage PTA disciplines to comply with WTO rules.
Regarding the role of the Secretariat in the negotiation process, it 
has lost importance over time. Active members increase in the aver-
age size of trade missions, more attention given to trade negotiations 
and more services provided by lawyers have weakened the role of 
the Secretariat in negotiations (ELSIG, 2009, p. 71). At the same time, 
the reluctance of members to delegate powers to the Secretariat has 
also not changed.
It is therefore necessary to allow the Secretariat to be able to 
effectively provide its contributions. The WTO is a “member-driv-
en” organization in which the Secretariat does not make itself heard 
enough. Allowing the Secretariat to do more to support political di-
alogue in WTO bodies and the work of WTO Members engaged in 
open plurilateral initiatives will strengthen the trading system (EL-
SIG, 2009, p. 72-74).
Another alternative, and perhaps the most - or the only - reason-
able one, is that of multilateralization.
B) MULTILATERALIZATION AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
Mavroidis and Bollyky (2017, p. 21) explain that preferential 
trade agreements are a second-best solution to the problem of trade 
liberalization and better regulation, as these agreements do not cover 
all countries participating in world trade. However, it is still import-
ant to “multilateralize” the progress in international regulatory co-
operation achieved byo these agreements and to integrate them into 
the WTO.
19 WTO Members, even if they should play the role of supervisors of the member-driven 
organization, are not neutral when analyzing the compatibility of a PTA with the law of the 
‘WTO. This is because all Members subscribe to a PTA, and fear retaliation in the event of a 
future notification concerning one of their agreements. 
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Multilateralizing progress in preferential trade agreements, as well 
as bilateral and regional initiatives, would reduce business costs, broaden 
regulatory cooperation and meet social preferences (if widely shared). In 
doing so, multilateralization would help unlock the social benefits of trade 
liberalization, both under the WTO and preferential trade agreements.
B.1) De facto multilateralization
Currently, a de facto multilateralization of preferential agreements 
is in place, since all the provisions which liberalize trade in services with 
regard to national suppliers can be extended to suppliers from States 
party to the agreement (B.1.1). Another possibility of achieving de facto 
multilateralization is through positive integration (B.1.2).
B.1.1) The example of the GATS
It is prescribed in the GATS and in article V of the GATS on economic 
integration agreements that national service suppliers of Members who 
are not parties to the agreement may benefit from these agreements as 
soon as they provide the preferential services in the territory. It is there-
fore a clause with TNPF effect, with the possibility of benefiting from 
the clauses of the PTA. Nonetheless, it is necessary to prove that the 
supplier is installed in the territory and carries out essential activities.
Foreign investors are mostly benefited, regardless of their nationali-
ty. This is the case with CETA, for example: American investors who are 
in Canada will benefit from this agreement.
This relationship between trade, services and investment had al-
ready been emphasized by Baldwin, who suggests an interconnection 
of these three disciplines as a distinctive characteristic of international 
trade in the XXI century (BALDWIN, 2011).
B.1.2) Towards positive integration
Beyond the example of multilateralization in services, thinking 
about a deeper regulatory integration would be a new and effective 
way to respond to the current challenges facing the WTO. 
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A new way because it would mean leaving with the spirit of GATT 
1994 behind, which has done only negative integration, limited to pro-
hibiting tariff barriers. The current objective is positive integration, to 
fight against non-tariff barriers to trade (such as divergent legislation). 
It is therefore necessary to promote a deep harmonization of nation-
al laws, such as CETA is trying to do, for example. And an effective 
one because a legislative change aimed at harmonizing the rules would 
undoubtedly have significant repercussions on trade relations. Changes 
and legislative harmonization in public health, health security, technical 
standards, etc.
Furthermore, in the case of positive integration, control comes from 
the Parties to the agreements, not from the WTO, by modifying their 
trade practices. Dialogue and cooperation agreements, for example, can 
help improve transparency, raise awareness among trading countries of 
the needs and costs for the others, and advance coordination between 
regulators, businesses and trade officials. And it’s also a way to get away 
from the spaghetti bowl problem.
If a PTA has made it possible to modify national legislation, this will 
necessarily benefit third States. Thus, there would be a de facto multi-
lateralization of certain provisions of economic free trade agreements 
(MAVROIDIS et. BOLLYKY, 2017). But this only works if the agreement 
goes in the direction of harmonizing national laws, not working if the 
States parties to the agreements are based on mutual recognition20, be-
cause promoting deep integration of national laws is not the same as 
recognizing the equivalence of standards in force in a country (CAR-
REAU, JUILLARD, 2004, p. 174). As Dominique Carreau et Patrick Ju-
lliard explains, mutual recognition does not imply legislative change, 
while positive integration does. 
B.2) Multilateralization by critical mass
The gradual multilateralization of PTA-related initiatives to inte-
grate them into the WTO can lead to a review of the decision-making 
processes of the multilateral trading system, in order to allow the con-
20 The concept of mutual recognition in European Union law implies that products import-
ed into one Member State from another will be presumed to be in conformity with the rules 
of the first Member State.
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clusion of non-discriminatory agreements between groups of specific 
Members - critical mass - in support of the multilateralization process 
(KRISHNA et. al., 2011, p. 45).
Critical mass exists when a sufficiently large body of Members 
agrees to cooperate under the auspices of the WTO. An important fea-
ture of this approach is that the agreements do not discriminate against 
non-signatory countries. Doctrine is particularly interested in how this 
phenomenon of PTA multilateralization can influence the decision-mak-
ing process within the WTO, examining the possibility of adopting a 
modified consensus rule. Warwick report (WARWICK COMMISSION, 
2007), introducing its version of critical mass decision-making, argues 
that there was a lesson to be learned from the Tokyo Cycle. 
During these negotiations, integrated by nearly 100 members, 
only a small group, led mainly by the United States and the Europe-
an Community, actively participated in negotiations organized like 
an inverted pyramid (WINHAM, 1986). First, the negotiations took 
place in bilateral contexts (United States-EC) and in small groups 
(United States, EC, Japan and Canada). Second, after an initial agree-
ment between these groups, the dominant players attempted to 
multilateralize the results by offering certain concessions to other 
potential parties to the agreements. Towards the end of the negoti-
ations, some developing countries became more involved in the ne-
gotiations, but the concessions offered by the main players were per-
ceived as too vague and as not meeting the objectives of the Tokyo 
Declaration. The main agreements have been concluded between the 
United States, the European Community and Japan. In other words, 
the critical mass was very low during the negotiations on non-tariff 
barriers. Lots of decision-making power concentrated on a reduced 
number of economic agents.
In summary, the Warwick report concludes that the results of 
critical mass negotiations do not affect the balance of rights and ob-
ligations and that the rights acquired by signatories are extended to 
all members on a non-discriminatory basis, obligations falling solely 
on signatory21. Thus, the report shares the view that critical mass 
21 Non-signatories will not have any obligations but will be able to benefit from the results: 
the free-rider phenomenon, which here is not particularly problematic.
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and non-discrimination, here as the most-favored-nation extension 
to non-participants, are aligned.
Adopting a critical mass approach would make it possible to 
“multilateralize” trade rules without involving all WTO Members, a 
proposal which may seem attractive when it is justified to have a reg-
ulatory approach to trade widely shared but not necessarily global.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this article, based on the analysis of the main issues of 
relationship between the PTA and the WTO, was to define whether 
the proliferation of PTA represented a crisis or an opportunity for the 
WTO. This question is the result of the challenges confronted by the 
WTO in the face of the proliferation of the PTA in recent decades, 
also affected by the complexification of GVC. As demonstrated at the 
beginning of this study, even if these agreements comply with WTO 
law, the problems they pose are due to the scale of their growth. It is 
a phenomenon that follows the trend of a generalized crisis of multi-
lateralism.
To answer this question, in the first section, this article has ana-
lyzed the symptoms indicating that the proliferation of the PTA is a 
normative and an institutional crisis of the WTO. 
In the normative sense, the principle of the single undertaking 
and the consensus rule explain why Members resort to plurilateral 
solutions in order to easily reach common ground. In addition, con-
sidering the weak legislative evolution since GATT 1947, insufficient 
to follow recent trends in international trade, such as the appearance 
of new disciplines (investments, industrial property, etc.), the PTA, 
through WTO-plus or WTO-extra provisions, deal with subjects not 
covered by the WTO. Finally, the acceleration of GVC has radically 
complicated the rules of origin, which remain a very important topic 
and difficult to resolve.
From an institutional point of view, the study demonstrated the 
insufficient supervision made by the WTO with regard to the PTA, 
resulting from the non-evolution of the applicable legislation and the 
weak transparency mechanism. In addition, another major problem 
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arises from the conflict of jurisdiction between the DSB and the dis-
pute settlement mechanisms present in the PTA.
At the end of the first section, this research allowed us to con-
clude that the growth of the PTA is both the source and the con-
sequence of a WTO crisis. Knowing that we are therefore facing a 
crisis, the challenge is to know if it is possible to transform these 
challenges into opportunities to renew the organization and recover 
its power.
In the second section, this article has tried to think of reasonable 
alternatives to take advantage of the new scenario of international 
trade to improve the multilateral trading system. As possible solu-
tions, we identify a strengthening of the supervision made by the 
WTO of the PTA countries, with a more powerful Secretariat, and 
the multilateralization of the benefits perceived by the PTA parties, 
whether de facto or via a critical mass of Members.
We hope that this article can provide a panoramic understqnd-
ing of the problems currently encountered by the WTO in the face 
of the trend of regionalism and the initiatives to be implemented for 
enriching results. 
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